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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
The respondent adopts the statement of the kind of
case involved in this appeal as stated in the appellant's
brief. It is a will contest.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
and

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
As stated by appellant, the lower court granted respondent's motion for a directed verdict at the conclusion
of appellant's evidence, all parties resting at that time,
and appellant now seeks a reversal of the lower court's
order and judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The rules of this court require an appellant to make
a complete statement of the material facts involved in the
record on appeal, not merely as the appellant contends
them to be, but viewing them as they must be on appeal,
favorable to the judgment of the lower court.
The statement of facts in appellant's brief is so
shockingly lacking in completeness and is so unfair in
presentation that respondents are compelled to set forth
a complete statement of facts.
The record in this case consists of the testimony and
exhibits introduced by appellant. Respondents did not
call a single witness or offer a single exhibit. It must be
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assumed, therefore, that appellant pre~ented the strongest
case which he was able to present. At the conclusion of
appellant's case it was so apparent to the trial court that
appellant had failed to make a prima facie case, that when
respondents also rested and moved for a directed verdict
the motion was granted. The record fully and completely
supports the trial court's action in granting that motion.
Margaret Holten was an ambitious and hard-working woman. In some manner not entirely made clear in
this record, she accumulated or came into the possession
of some means which enabled her to go into the real estate and investment business. By shrewd, careful, and
frugal management, she gradually accumulated money
and property until at the time of her death her wealth
had become considerable.

1

Margaret Holten was the mother of a feebleminded
son whom she called "Buddy." After his birth her husband deserted her. Margaret Holten cared for Buddy
in her home for twenty-six years until his death in the
spring of 1956. (R. 94)
Margaret Holten had very little contact with her
brother, Paul Schramm, the contestant herein; his wife or
two children, Byran Paul Schramm and Mary Schramm
Ashworth. Paul Schramm moved to California in 1909.
(R. 75) From that time to the date of her death,
Margaret Holten periodically visited Paul Schramm in
California. (R. 78)
In 1956, Margaret Holten visited with Paul Schramm
at the time of the dedication of the L. D. S. Temple in
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Los Angeles. (R. 81) At this time Byran Paul Schramm
discussed with her business affairs and various stocks
which they both owned. They also discussed an offer to
purchase which Margaret Holten had received on a piece
of property near the Sears, Roebuck store in Salt Lake
City. (R. 120-21)

In July 1957, Margaret Holten again visited with
Paul Schramm in Los Angeles. At this time th_ey discussed some of the trust deeds which Margaret Holten
owned. (R. 108)
After the July 1957 visit, it was not until July 1960,
nine months after the execution of the holographic will,
that Paul Schramm or his children had any personal contact with Margaret Holten. (R. 96, 100) During this
time, Margaret Holten corresponded with Paul
Schramm's wife. Paul Schramm noticed nothing in any
of this correspondence which was unusual or different.

(R. 75-76)

In July 1960, Paul Schramm's wife died. Margaret
Holten traveled to California by bus to attend the
funeral. (R. 113-14) At this time Paul Schramm noticed that Margaret Holten could not talk without stuttering. (R. 79) He observed that Margaret Holten
refused to lie down or go to bed, but sat up in bed until
3 :00 o'clock in the morning with the light on. (R. 80)
Although Margaret Holten had difficulty with her speech
at this time, she understood perfectly what Paul
Schramm and his children said to her. (R. 109, 118)
At this time Paul Schramm did not attempt to con-
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tact a physician to check Margaret Holten's physical condition. (R. 98) After the funeral Paul Schramm put her
on the bus and sent her home alone. Subsequently, she
sent a postcard and told Paul Schramm that she had arrived safely. (R. 98)
Neither Paul Schramm nor his children gave any
opinion as to the testamentary capacity of Margaret Holten, nor did they know of any person who exercised undue influence or was even present at the time the
holographic will was executed by Margaret Holten. (R.
109, 117, 127-28)
Margaret Holten had a close and intimate relationship with Pauline Hamilton from 1946 or '47 until shortly
before her death. (R. 207) Margaret Holten taught Mrs.
Hamilton and got her into the business of buying and
dealing in real estate contracts. (R. 206) Mrs. Hamilton
expressed the opinion that Margaret Holten was a very
competent business woman and that there was never a
time when she was unable to take care of her business
' affairs. (R. 207)
1

During the course of the close association, Margaret
Holten told Pauline Hamilton how she wanted to dispose
of her property at her death. Testatrix told Mrs. Hamilton on many occasions that she was going to give her
property to the L.D.S. Church. After Buddy died in
the spring of 1956, these conversations began and continued over the next few years, a substantial time before
the execution of the formal will, dated February 18, 1959,
and the holographic will, dated October 13, 1959. (R. 197,
200-202, 207)
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Margaret Holten also especially indicated during
this period that she did not want her brother, Paul
Schramm, to have any of her property. Mrs. Holten had
stated that her brother had never done anything for her
or helped support her mother. (R. 196-97) Margaret
Holten had talked to her brother about the care of
Buddy if anything ever happened to her and she was
unable to care for him. He told her that he would have
nothing to do with his care. (R. 200)
Although Margeret Holten was an able and competent business woman, she was eccentric, irritable and
somewhat of a crank. On one occasion a child of her
neighbor, Mr. Morris, came on her property with a dog.
Mrs. Holten came out of her house with a butcher knife
swearing and chased the child off her property. (R. 156)
She frequently swore at her neighbors. (R. 157) She
called the police one time when Mr. Morris went on her
property to remove her garbage. (R. 158) In an altercation with another neighbor, Mr. Atkin, she called the
police and had him arrested. (R. 190-91) On one occasion Margaret Holten yelled at Mr. Atkin and told him
that she hated him and that nobody liked him and that
he was "ugly and sour". (R. 193)
Dr. Joyce Henrie, a psychiatrist, from an examination
of Margaret Holten's diary, testified that Margaret Holten
was a "chronic paranoid personality, bordering at times
on a paranoid reaction." (R. 164)
Dr. Henrie stated:
"You would describe a chronic paranoid per-
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sonality as . . . by the lay people more described
as a crank or an eccentric, someone who is always
irritable and quarrelsome." (R. 165)
Notwithstanding Dr. Henrie's opinion that Margaret
Holten was a chronic paranoid personality, she testified
that she was mentally competent:

"Q. . . . Now, doesn't this diary show evidence

that Margaret Holton knew who her family
was?
"A. I said 'Yes.'

"Q. And doesn't the diary show that she knew
what her property consisted of?
"THE COURT: Mr. Bowen, I don't think this
doctor has ever said that the lady lacked mental
capacity.
"A. I certainly did not.

"Q. You have not said that?
"A. Certainly not. I have not inferred it.
haven't even discussed that." (R. 178)

We

Dr. Henrie also testified that Margaret Holten might
be more susceptible to religious influence than other
people. (R. 172-73) In further explanation she stated:
"THE COURT: Would there be anything to
her tendency to belligerency that would cause
her to rebel against anyone trying to influence
her, whether religious or not?
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"A. She would be very prone to develop-to
rebel toward people, but if the religion-the power
as such were portrayed to her in a way that was
convincing, I doubt that she would rebel toward
that.
"THE COURT: Thank you.

"Q. Doctor, would she be less inclined to
rebel against people who represent the power
you just described?

"A. I think Mrs. Holten would rebel toward
almost any person from what I have seen of her
diary, irregardless of their affiliation."
Dr. Henrie further stated that there was no entry in
the diary that would support a conclusion that Margaret
Holten was prevailed upon by anybody to write the will
in question. (R. 183) The entries in the diary would indicate that in February, 1959, she was capable of knowing
that she was drawing a will and that she was capable of
knowing her property and heirs. (R. 183) Dr. Henrie
also stated that when the holographic will was written by
Mrs. Holten the will itself indicated that she was in control of her decision as to whom she wanted as her executor
because she made a change. (R. 185)

In 1959 Margaret Holten first met Bishop Buehner.

She had gone to the Church offices to see one of the general authorities of the L.D.S. Church. Since Bishop
Buehner was available he talked with her. Margaret Holten had come to discuss a problem with a neighbor who
was encroaching on her property. (R. 148-49)
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The second time they met was uneventful. Margaret
Holten had only dropped in to Bishop Buehner's office
to pass the time of day. (R. 149)
The third time she contacted Bishop Buehner at his
office, she mentioned her impending hysterectomy
operation, her invalid son and how she loved him, and
that her husband had deserted her twenty-five or some
years earlier. She told Bishop Buehner that she had a
brother whom she hardly ever heard from, that she had
worked hard in the real estate business, and that she had
acquired a little property. She told him that she had decided to leave her property to the L.D.S. Church. (R.
149-50)

Upon learning of Margaret Holten's desire to leave
her property to the Church and ascertaining that she had
an interest in genealogy, he suggested that she might
leave her property to the Genealogical Society of the
L.D.S. Church. At no time did Buehner ask Margaret
Holten to will her property to the Church or try to persuade her to make the Genealogical Society the vehicle
for the accomplishment of her purpose. (R. 150)
With this background, Margaret Holten requested
Bishop Buehner to arrange to have the Church's legal
, counsel draft a will for her. (R. 152) Buehner introduced
. her to Vernon Snyder. The introduction was brief.
Buehner merely told Snyder that Mrs. Holten had
requested him to ask Snyder to prepare a will and would
he do so. After this introduction Buehner had nothing
whatever to do with the preparation of the will. (R. 152,
153) He never saw the will nor discussed it further with
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Snyder. He was unaware that it provided for him to be
the executor. (R 141-43)
Mrs. Holten told Snyder what she wanted in her
will and he prepared it as she directed. She specifically
instructed him to provide that her property was to go to
the Church. She also repeated what she had told Buehner;
namely, she gave Snyder her brother's name, told him
that she had a deceased son, that her husband had deserted her many years before, and that she did not want
her brother to have her property. (R. 141-43)
A few days later, after the will was prepared, Margaret Holten came back to Mr. Snyder's office. The will
was read aloud and she expressed satisfaction that the
will was as she desired. (R. 134) After the will was executed on February 18, 1959, Snyder kept the document
until the testatrix came and asked for it some time later.
(R. 13 6) After this time Snyder never saw the will again
and only saw Mrs. Holten a couple of times on the street.
(R. 137-38) After February 18, 1959, neither Buehner
nor Snyder discussed the subject of a will with Margaret
Holten. (R. 137, 141-43)
On October 13, 1959, nearly eight months later,
Margaret Holten wrote the will now under attack in her
own handwriting. (Ex. C-7) The dispositive provisions
of the holographic will were the same as the first will.
However, in the holographic will, Margaret Holten had
changed the executor from Bishop Buehner to the TracyCollins Bank & Trust Company. There is no evidence in
the record as to who was present or the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the holographic will. The
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appellant frankly admits this in his brief. (p. 2) Mr.
Snyder did not know that she had written the second will
(R. 142); and neither did Bishop Buehner. (R. 152)
The holographic will was found by the appellant and his
children in a locked steel cabinet on Margaret Holten's
porch two or three days after her death. (R. 87, 89)

~

On September 28, 1960, a year after the holographic
will was executed, Margaret Holten consulted Dr. D. C.
Bernson, a neurosurgeon, with a complaint of headaches
and dizziness. (R. 210, 211) The consultation occurred
in Dr. Bernson's office at which place Mrs. Holten presented herself unaided and unassisted. ( R. 218, 219) At
this time she knew that she was to see the doctor and gave
the usual personal and medical information to Dr. Bernson's secretary, including the fact that she had a brother,
Paul. (R. 218-219)

Dr. Bernson's tentative diagnosis of her difficulty
was "some sort of mass, tumor or hematoma, or blood
clot". (R. 213) He recommended that Mrs. Holten be
hospitalized for further tests and diagnosis. This recom' mendation she refused to accept. Two months after his
initial examination, Dr. Bernson wrote a letter to Mrs.
Holten advising her of the seriousness of her situation and
again recommending hospitalization. (R. 213)
In October, 1962, two years after Dr. Bernson's initial examination, a non-malignant tumor the size of a baseball was removed from Margaret Holten's skull. (Ex. C-3)
The tumor was exceedingly slow-growing and was probably present for a long period of time, possibly six or seven
years. It was located on the left side and involved the
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temporal parietal areas which would affect the patient's
memory. (R. 216-17) Dr. Bernson further testified that
although he felt that this brain tumor had been present
for a long time it would be difficult and largely conjecture to estimate how long it had been growing, and
further, that it would be impossible to state with any certainty when the size of the tumor became such that it
would affect her ability to know and understand what her
business was, who her relatives were, or would interfere
with her ability to make or formulate a plan of disposing
of her estate. (R. 219-20)
On the basis of his examination of Margaret Holten
md the hospital records, Dr. Bernson was unable to testify that on October 13, 1959, when she executed the
holographic will, that she was mentally incompetent.
(R. 220 ) However, in response to a hypothetical question, Dr. Bernson did state that:

"If she was able to collect moneys and keep

track of sums and additions and handle this sort
of thing, I would-in my opinion I would say I
think she was probably mentally competent at
that time." (R. 223)

ARGUMENT

I

THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER GRANTING A
DIRECTED VERDICT WAS PROPER AND
SHOULD BE SUSTAINED.

Appellant's contention that he was entitled to have
this case submitted to a jury is founded upon the argu·
ment that the evidence submitted by plaintiff created
a presumption of testamentary incapacity and undue in-
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fluence in the execution of testatrix's last will and testament. It is certainly clearly and unmistakably admitted
by him that the record does not contain any direct, positive, or clear evidence on either of these propositions.
On page 2 of his brief, appellant concedes that there
is no evidence as to where, or the circumstances under
which, decedent's last will was written. There is no evidence that when this will, made on October 13, 1959
(Ex. C-7), was written, any person had any knowledge
concerning it other than testatrix herself. There is no
evidence in the record that Margaret Holten lacked
testamentary capacity at that time, or that at that time she
acted under a delusion, paranoid reaction, or other abnormal mental condition. Neither is there the slightest
evidence that on that day, or any day near said date, any
person connected with the L.D.S. Church or the Genealogical Society influenced testator in any way or made
suggestions to her as to how she should write her will.
Appellant cites a decision of this court which lays
down the rules by which testamentary capacity and undue influence are to be determined. The case of In Re
George's Estate, 100 Utah 230, 112 P2d 498 (1941)
cited by appellant in his brief, holds that there must be
proof of facts which show that at the time the will was
signed there was such pressure being exerted upon the
mind of the testator that his volition was overpowered
by it.
That case also holds that merely because the testator
is old and weak and is emotionally unstable; that his will
made two of his children his sole beneficiaries to the ex-
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clusion of his other children; that one of the beneficiaries
was instrumental in getting counsel to prepare and subscribing witnesses to witness the will; that the two beneficiaries named in the will had been in close association
with the testator and had already received much property from him by way of gifts, and that his other children
had been almost entirely excluded from association with
him, was not enough to support a finding of undue influence of mental incompetency.

II

THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES AS A MATTER
OF LAW THAT TEST ATRIX'S HOLOGRAPHIC
WILL WAS NOT THE PRODUCT OF UNDUE
INFLUENCE

Almost all of appellant's brief is devoted to an attack upon a document which is not the testatrix's last will
and testament at all. The circumstances surrounding the
execution of that document are not even relevant to the
issues of this case.
Appellant directs his main argument against a prior
will of Margaret Holten written over seven months before
her last will was executed. Appellant claims that because the testatrix executed a will on February 18, 1959,
leaving the bulk of her estate to the Genealogical Society
after consulting with Bishop Carl Buehner, at that time
one of the general authorities of the L.D.S. Church, and
after that document had been prepared by the Church's
legal counsel at decendent's request, a prima facie case
of undue influence was established against her last will,
which presumption must remain until rebutted by the
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respondents even though there is no evidence that either
Buehner or said legal counsel were in any way connected
with the preparation or signing of the last will. The only
basis for such claim is that the two documents are similar
in that they give to appellant only a nominal amount and
the bulk of decedent's estate to the Genealogical Society
of the L.D.S. Church. Because of this similarity, it is argued that the latter document must have been copied from
the earlier one and therefore all of the alleged infirmities
of the prior will automatically attach themselves to the
last will. Appellant also argues that testatrix was abnormal mentally by reason of afflictions of body and mind
and psychotic tendencies and was susceptible to suggestions and influence because of her peculiar religious
beliefs.
Respondent submits that the argument of appellant
rests not upon evidence but upon speculation, inference,
and innuendo and upon the conclusions of a person who
never saw the deceased. Furthermore, respondent submits that the testimony of the witnesses, upon whom appellant relies so heavily, does not support appellant's
position and that the distorted, unrealistic picture
painted by appellant's brief will not stand up under critical examination.
Margaret Holten was not a pathetic, defenseless old
woman pictured by appellant as hopelessly unable to
manage her affairs and decide upon the disposition of
her property by will. The facts are that she was a woman
of unusual competence in business affairs who, for over
thirty years, alone and unassisted by anyone, built up a
sizeable estate that would have been a credit to the most
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accomplished, shrewd and able businessman. The record
of her activities and accomplishments at the very time
when this will was made is a complete answer to the unsupported claims of appellant. The following is quoted
from the testimony of Pauline Hamilton, called by the
appellant to be a witness and by whose testimony he is
bound. Pauline Hamilton knew and associated with the
testatrix for over thirty years. (R. 195) Pauline Hamilton's business association with Margaret Holten lasted
from 1946 or 1947 until the time of decedent's death. She
testified as follows:

"Q. Did you ever find-did you come to any
conclusion about whether Margaret Holten was
a competent business woman?
"A. Well, I considered her very competent although very ruthless.

"Q. Now, Mrs. Hamilton, over what period
of time did these business associations with Margaret Holton last?
"A. Well, until shortly before she died.

"Q. And when"A. From about 1946 or '47.

"Q. Was there any time that you ever observed
her when she was unable to take care of het
business affairs?
"A. There was never a time she didn't take care
of her business. That came first." (R. 207)
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Appellant called no other witness who had known
and associated with Margaret Schramm Holten intimately or frequently during the last years of her life. Both
Viola Parkinsort and Adele Bird, who had known Margaret Holten very well over a long period of time, were in
court under appellant's subpoena during the trial but
neither was ever called to testify. He called Mr. Atkin
and Mr. Morris, neighbors of the deceased who were unable to get along with her. Neither of them gave any
testimony even remotely tending to prove undue influence in connection with decedent's last will or proving
her to be mentally incompetent. Their testimony was
confined to the incidents of testatrix's sometimes unreasonable conduct toward them and members of their
families.
Nor did appellant or his son or daughter, who also
testified, provide any support to his claim of undue influence or testamentary incapacity. They all acknowledged that they had no proof of such influence
ever having been exerted upon testatrix in connection
with her last will. (R. 109, '117, 127-28)
This leaves Dr. Henrie and Dr. Bernson who were
the only other witnesses who testified. On the subject
of undue influence, Dr. Henrie stated that she had nothing whatsoever to offer. (R. 181, 183, 185) All that Dr.
Henrie' said was that in her opinion Margaret Holten, as
revealed by the writing in her diary, was a person susceptible of being influenced by religious considerations.
She stated that she had absolutely no opinion that this
susceptibility had been used and worked upon by anyone
at the time testatrix's last will was written and executed.
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Dr. Bernson was not even asked to testify on the subject
of undue influence.

In view of the foregoing state of the record, it is a
gross overstatement for counsel to say that his claim of
undue influence rests upon a presumption.

III UNDUE INFLUENCE, THOUGH PROVEN, EXERCISED IN CONNECTION WITH A PRIOR
WILL WILL NOT INVALIDATE A LATER WILL
UNLESS THAT UNDUE INFLUENCE IS CONNECTED WITH THE LATER WILL BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE
The law is clear with respect to the evidentiary effect of undue influence used in connection with a prior
will upon a later will. The cases uniformly hold that if a
will has been secured by undue influence and thereafter
at a later date a new will is executed which confirms the
first will or which contains the same provisions of the
first will with respect to bequests or devises, the effect
of the undue influence in connection with the first will
is nullified, unless it can be shown by competent evidence
that the same undue influence procured the execution
of the later will or codicil.

In re Welch's Estate, 272 P.2d 512 (Cal. 1954),

the court said the following at pages 516-17:

«Almost two years after execution of the will,
Myrtle added a handwritten codicil to her handwritten will, on the same paper, merely appointing Arthur as executor. Manifestly the testamen-
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tary disposition of her property was then drawn
to her attention, and yet Myrtle did not elect to
make any change. While Geraldine argues that
Arthur's conduct upon moving into Myrtle's home
following the death of Myrtle's husband operated
to coerce Myrtle into making the will in question
over three weeks later, there was no semblance of
a showing of any pressure or overpowering activity on his part at or near the time of her execution
of the codicil. The latter act had the effect of
reexecution of the will and removed any possible
taint of undue influence which might be argued
with respect to its original procurement.

"At most, the record here shows no more than
that Arthur was so situated as to have had an opportunity to unduly influence the mind of Myrtle,
and that his actions and conduct at times might be
regarded as suspicious; but to say that from such
evidence it may be found that Arthur 'overpowered the mind and bore down the volition of the
[testatrix] at the very time the will was made'
would be to permit Myrtle's will to be overturned
not upon proof but upon speculation. In re Estate of Gleason, 164 Cal. 756, 765; 130 P. 872.
Moreover, the final testamentary act in question
was Myrtle's execution of the holographic codicil republishing her will, and as to which there
was not the slightest basis for finding that it was
the product of undue influence by Arthur."
In Taft v. Stearns, 125 N.E. 570 (Mass., 1920), the
court said at pages 571-72:
"A will as modified by a codicil 1s thereafter
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to be taken and construed as a will of the date of
the codicil. Pratt v. Rice, 7 Cush. 209, 212.
"This principle is applicable to an instrument
executed in form as a will, but inoperative as
such because executed through fraud or undue
influence, which is referred to as a will in a codicil
subsequently executed freely, unaffected by
fraud or undue influence. There is no reason why
such a will, although invalid when framed because the result of the overpowering importunity
of another, may not be adopted and declared as
a true expression of testamentary desires after
the vitiating control of the other dominating mind
has been removed or has faded or subsided.

* * * * *
"The result is that, the answer of the jury
having established the codicil as the free and untrammeled expression of the testamentary purpose of the deceased, and the will having been affirmed and republished by the codicil, both instruments should be admitted to probate."

In re George's Estate, 100 Utah 230; 112 P. 2d 498
(1941), this court said at page 503:
"Assuming that the father was dissatisfied with
what he had done by those deeds, plenty of time
had elapsed for him to have changed his mind, and
to have concluded that the transfers were what
he desired after all."
See also, In re Baird's Estate, 168 P. 561, 176 Cal. 381
(1917) and Warren v. Sanders, 287 S.W. 2d 146 (Ky.,
1946). These cases illustrate the absurdity of claiming that
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a presumption of undue influence in connection with an
earlier will continues into the execution of a later will until it has been rebutted.

IV THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD WILL NOT
SUPPORT A PRESUMPTION OF UNDUE INFLUENCE
With this background respondents now desire to
address themselves to the contention of appellant that
there was undue influence in the execution of Margaret
Holten's will dated February 18, 1959.
We have already pointed out that there is no direct
evidence in the record which even remotely supports
appellant's proposition. Appellant's argument is based
entirely upon the fact that the testatrix had talked with
Bishop Buehner and had asked him to arrange to have the
attorney for the Church draw her will.

V

THE EVIDENCE WILL NOT SUPPORT A PRESUMPTION THAT BISHOP BUEHNER USED
UNDUE INFLUENCE IN CONNECTION WITH
TEST ATRIX'S LAST WILL AND TEST AMENT

The facts were uncontradicted that Mrs. Holten
sought out Bishop Buehner in the first instance. It was
she who opened the discussion about her will and what
she desired to do with her property and who stated that
she wanted to give it to the Church. (R. 148-52) Substantially the same thing occurred in her conversations
with Vernon Snyder. (R. 129-37, 141-44)
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None of this testimony contains any evidence of undue influence having been used by either Bishop Buehner or Vernon Snyder, but it is argued this need not be
shown because the relationship of the parties created a
presumption of undue influence. It is true that in many
instances where a bequest of money is made to a person,
in some confidential or fiduciary relationship with the
testator, who influences the making of a will in his favor,
a presumption of undue influence will arise provided it
appears that such gift was made under circumstances
which show that the gift would not have been made except for the importuning of the donee and that such
importuning overpowered the will of the testator, and
either forced or improperly induced the making of the
gift. (In re Swan's Estate, 4 Utah 2d. 277, 293 P2d 692)
However, even in such cases, it is held that mere suggestion or request made to the testator is not undue
influence.

In re Bryan's Estate, 82 Utah 390, 25 P2d 602
(1933) the court declared at page 410:
"* * >:· The most that can be said is that during the few minutes he was alone with the testator, he, notwithstanding his testimony to the contrary, may have suggested a disposition of the

testator's property to the school over which he
presided. Undue influence must be proved. It
will not be presumed from mere interest or opportunity. The opportunity to exercise influence,

unless combined with circumstances tending to
show its exercise, affords no presumption that it
was in fact exercised." (Emphasis added)
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Furthermore, the law is that there must be more than
a showing of opportunity or desire to exercise undue influence. It must be actually exercised. In re Hanson's
Will, 50 Utah 207, 221, 167 P. 256 (1917); In re Bryan's
Estate, supra, at page 410; Clark v. Johnson, 105 S.W. 2d
576, 268 Ky. 591 ( 1937).
Also, before a presumption of undue influence arises,
the donee must have secured some direct benefit for himself under the will or for someone close to him in order
for undue influence to vitiate a will. In re Bryan's Estate,
supra, p. 410:
Prior to the making of the will, there had never
been between them any confidence in the nature of confession or administration of sacraments. Father Kennedy was not a beneficiary of
the will. Adams v. First Methodist Episcopal
Church, 251 Ill. 268, 96 N.E. 253."
In the Adams case referred to above, cited by the
court, the testatrix left all of her estate to the
Methodist Episcopal Church. Her brother and sister attacked the will on grounds of mental incapacity and undue influence. The jury upheld the will which was
affirmed on appeal. The Illinois court stated, on page 256:
"It is argued that there was a confidential relation existing between the testatrix and the
pastor and trustees of the church. Such a relation
exists between a priest or spiritual adviser and
his parishioner (Dowie v. Driscoll, 203 Ill. 480,
68 N.E. 56; Gilmore v. Less, 237 Ill. 402, 86 N.E.
568, 127 Am. St. Rep. 330), and, if the priest or
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spiritual adviser receives a gift from the parishioner, the burden is upon him to show the absence of undue influence, but the pastor has no
financial interest in the church or the church
property, and in this case the will conferred no
benefit upon the pastor."

In Gilmore v. Atwell, 283 S.W. 2d 636 (Mo., 1955),
the court, on page 641, quotes from Vol. 2 of Page, Wills,
Section 840, p. 655, as follows:
"No presumption of undue influence arises
where a testator makes a gift for religious purposes with which the spiritual advisor of such
testator is closely connected."
The court further stated, on page 642:
"Under the proponents' cases, including the
majority holding of court en bane in Tibbe v.
Kamp, supra, in the light of the change effected
in the law by Leohr v. Starke, supra, an inference
of undue influence did not arise from the clergyman's activities in connection with his communicant's will, the Church, and not the clergyman,
being the beneficiary."
See also, Daugherty v. State Savings, Loan f5 Trust
Co., 126 N.E. 545, 292 Ill. 147 (1920), in which the court
stated on page 547:

"* * * The only basis, if it can be said to be a
basis at all, to support the claim of undue influence is that S. B. Montgomery, who drew the
will, was a stockholder and officer of the banking institution made trustee and executor, and an
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officer of the Blessing Hospital board. So far as
the proof shows, the testator went alone, on his
own suggestion, to the bank and asked Montgomery to draw his will. Montgomery did so in a
back room of the bank, and when it was completed
two employees of the bank were called into the
room and testator told them the document was
his will, and asked them to sign as witnesses,
which they did. There is no proof that Montgomery ever advised or suggested the making of the
will or any of its provisions, and the mere fact

that institutions in which he was interested received substantial benefits from the will, under
all the authorities, does not support the claim
of undue influence." (Emphasis added)

See also, In re Fletcher's Estate, 269 P.2d 349 (Okla.,
1954) and In re Conway's Estate, 79 A 2d 208, 366 Pa.
641 ( 1951).
Measured by these standards, where does the record
leave the appellant with respect to Bishop Buehner"s
connection with Margaret Holten's earlier will? First
of all, there was no competent evidence produced by
appellant which will support a finding that any confidential relationship existed between Bishop Buehner
and the deceased. He was not her confidential business
or spiritual advisor. She had never consulted him about
how she should dispose of he·r property by will. She
came to him with her mind already made up to give
her property to the Church or one of its related institutions. The only question discussed between Bishop
Buehner and decedent was which of the Church's institutions would best accomplish the purpose she had ill
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mind. On one occasion she asked for assistance in the
settlement of a disagreement with a neighbor, and once,
when she was sick, deceased requested the Bishop to
give her a blessing. These two instances did not make
Bishop Buehner Margaret Holten's spiritual advisor.
Furthermore, there is no evidence at all to suggest any
contention that Bishop Buehner was acting as the spiritual advisor of deceased on October 13, 1959; the record
is the exact opposite of such situation. The record consistently shows the exact opposite of such contention.

In Newell v. Halloran, 68 Utah 407, 250 P. 96
(1926), cited by appellant in his brief, the court stated
at page 414:

"* * * Mere confidence in one person by
another is not sufficient alone to constitute a fiduciary relationship. The confidence must be
reposed by one under such circumstances as to
create a corresponding duty, either legal or
moral, upon the part of the other to observe the
confidence, and it must result in a situation where
as a matter of fact there is superior influence on
one side and dependence on the other."
There simply cannot be a finding that Buehner
was guilty of undue influence based upon the evidence
in the record. The evidence does not show that Buehner
suggested in any way that Margaret Holten leave her
estate to the Church or to its Genealogical Society. The
record is the exact reverse. It is granted that Bishop
Buehner was in a position to urge Margaret Holten to
leave her property to the Society, but he did not do so,
·and, as pointed out, mere opportunity to exercise undue
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influence is not enough; it must be actually shown to have
been used. Furthermore, this earlier will created no
personal benefit for Buehner. He got nothing for himself either directly or indirectly by its terms. The finespun, tenuous, and wholly unsupported claim of appellant
that Buehner, because he was a general authority of the
L.D.S. Church and may have received some intangible
benefit from the will of Margaret Holten, is without
merit. There are many cases where wills have left property to religious or charitable organizations at the suggestion of a priest or pastor or other religious figure or
person in charge of such institution where it has been
held that such connection between such institutions and
its pastor, priest, or other person in control at the time a
will is made is immaterial. In re Bryan's Estate, supra,
at p. 411; In re Hanson's Will, 50 Utah 207, at p. 219,
167 P. 256 ( 1917); Clark v. Johnson, 105 S.W. 2d 576
(Ky, 1937); Gilmore v. Atwell, supra; Daugherty v.
State Savings Loan f5 Trust Co., supra; and In re Conway's Estate, supra.

VI THE EVIDENCE WILL NOT SUPPORT A PRESUMPTION THAT VERNON SNYDER USED
UNDUE INFLUENCE IN CONNECTION WITH
TEST ATRIX'S LAST WILL AND TEST AMENT.
The same rules and tests that apply to Buehner's
conduct with respect to Margaret Holten's earlier will
also apply to Vernon Snyder, at that time legal counsel
for the L.D.S. Church. There is, however, one additional
factor in the case of Snyder. He was legal counsel for

~8

the

Church and its various organizations. In acting in
the preparation of Mrs. Holten's will, he was in a position
of trust and confidence. Would the fact that he operated
in this dual capacity create a presumption of undue influence with respect to this earlier will? Respondent
claims that the record entirely supports its contention that there was no evidence of undue influence.
There is no evidence that Snyder violated any confidential relationship with Margaret Holten. He got no benefit from this earlier will. His position as scrivener of
this will is not even remotely close to the situation involving McFarlane in the case of In Re Swan's Estate,
supra.
But assuming that there may be some room for arguing that a presumption of undue influence arose because Snyder was the scrivener with respect to Margaret
Holten's earlier will, there is positive evidence in this
record which utterly, effectively, and completely destroys it. In the first place, the will of February 18, 1959,
which counsel so vigorously argues is tainted by undue
_influence, is not the will under consideration. The last
will of Margaret Holten was not dated February 18,
1959; it: was dated October 13, 1959, over seven months
;if ter the earlier will was signed. This is a fact from
which there is no escape. Furthermore, there is no escape
from the fact that there is not one iota of evidence to
connect either Bishop Buehner or Snyder with the execution of decedent's last will on October 13, 1959. Because of this fact the trial court properly ruled that before there could be any submission of the issue of undue
influence to the jury because of any presumption which
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may have attached to the earlier will, it was indispensable for appellant to connect the same undue influence
with respect to the later will.

It is at this point that appellant's entire case for

undue influence collapses.
We have already demonstrated why this is so, by the cases and authorities which
have been cited and which will not be repeated at this
point.
There is an even more fundamental and basic reason
why the appellant's claim of undue influence must fail.
This is demonstrated clearly in the testimony of Pauline
Hamilton, appellant's own witness, who was not associated with any will of decedent in any way and was wholly
disinterested. Her testimony is a complete corroboration
of what both Buehner and Snyder say occurred when
Margaret Holten came to see them in February 1959,
and stated to them her desire to leave her estate to the
Church and not to her brother. It must be remembered
that appellant's only complaint of error in this case is
based upon an alleged continuing presumption of undue
influence which, appellant argues, the trial court was
bound to submit to the jury. Appellant clearly concedes
that his whole case rests upon presumption and not
upon evidence.
Now, what did Pauline Hamilton say about what
Margaret Holten had told her, long before she ever saw
Buehner or Snyder, about what she intended to do with
her estate? For years before her operation in March
19 59, for a hysterectomy, she had told Pauline Hamilton
that she was going to give her property to the Church
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and this statement was made to Mrs. Hamilton by the
decedent on several occasions. This is Pauline Hamilton's testimony on direct examination by the appellant's
own counsel:

"Q. Now, calling your attention to the year

1959 and to the conversations that you may or

may not have had with her during that period,
I would like to ask you if she talked to you about
her hysterectomy operation.
"A. Yes, she did.

"Q. And did she talk to you during that pe-

riod of time about what she intended to do with
her property in the event she died?

"A. Well, she talked to me before she had her
hysterectomy.

"Q. How soon before?
"A. Oh, it was-well, for years she told me how
she wanted to dispose of her property.

"Q. Would you relate if you can the conversation that you had with her previous to her
hysterectomy operation?
"A. You mean just before her operation, shortly
before?

"Q. Shortly before her operation.
"A. Well, shortly before her operation she said
that she wanted the Church to be the beneficiary
of whatever she had. (R. 196)
On cross-examination, Mrs. Hamilton said:
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"Q. And did Margaret Holten know that you
were in that business?
"A. Not at that time, not until I moved in
Canyon Road, and then I discovered that she
was dealing in contracts, discounted real estate
contracts.

"Q. Did she discuss these"A. Yes.

"Q. -transactions"A. Yes.

"Q. -with you?
"A And she said that's how she made her
money and she was able to stay home and take
care of her little Buddy.

"Q. And did she make any suggestions to you
about getting into that business?
"A. Well, at one time she thought I was
bright enough to go into that business, and she
could probably teach me something about it. I
became interested in anything that I could make
money legally, and so I got three contracts from
her, a total of three. They were not the best, but
at least I got started.

"Q. And did she teach you many things?
"A. She taught me about real estate contracts,
yes. That's how I got into the business.
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"Q. And how to service the contracts?
"A. Yes.

"Q. And how to collect on them?
"A. Yes. (R. 206)
After Buddy died, Mrs. Holten discussed the disposition of her estate with Mrs. Hamilton. Mrs. Hamilton had suggested to her that she leave her estate to a
foundation for mentally defective children. Mrs. Holten
repudiated this suggestion and on several occasions said
the Church would get her property. (R. 200)

The following testimony was given also on direct
examination by appellant's counsel:
..Q. Now, did you inqu:ir~after this pa;rtic:ular conversation did you make any further inquiry as to what she had done with her property?

"A. I couldn't care less what she did with
it, but I do know that she mentioned several
times that she was going to leave it to the Church.
One time she said she would leave it to the
Church, and then the Church could take care of
her; and I said, 'Margaret, you are in no condition
to have them take care of you now. You are able
to take care of yourself,' and she said well, that's
true, but she had been thinking about it." (R.
200-201)

.. * * * *
"Mr. Frank Gustin: Would you repeat the question?
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"REPORTER: •Mrs. Hamilton, wasn't there
an occasion of a conversation that you had with
Margaret Holten when she mentioned that she
had had a conversation with Viola Parkinson and
that after that conversation with Viola Parkinson
she had decided to leave her money to the
Church?
"A. Well, she had said so many times she
would leave her money to the Church that I
can't remember the relationship between Viola
Parkinson and saying this. She may have done.
I wouldn't be sure." (R. 202)
Again on cross-examination, Mrs. Hamilton said:

"Q. You mentioned in your testimony that she
talked about her brother .

.. A. Many times .

.. Q. Many times. And what she desired to do
with her property, she told you that.. A. Yes.

.. Q. -Said that she wanted to leave it to the
Church?
..A. Yes.

"Q. And didn't want her brother to have it?
«A. That's right." (R. 207)
The courts have considered statements by a testator
of his intentions made before the execution of his last
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will on the issue or claim of undue influence. Appellant
cities such a case in his brief-Longenecker v. Evangelical Lutheran Church, 5 0 A. 244 (Pa., 1901). In that case
it was, in effect, held that such declarations are to be
given great consideration in connection with claims that
undue influence procured the execution of a will. The
count stated on page 246:
"* >:· >:· There is no testimony m the case that
Mr. Reist in any way induced, or attempted to
induce, this old lady to do what is now made the
subject of this complaint; on the contrary, it was
shown by him that she often declared her intention of making some such gift."

Undue influence in cases of this kind where it has
been found to exist, has always persisted up until the
death of the testator. The will of Margaret Holten was
in her possession for three years after she made it and
before she died. It was in her house under her control.
If this document had been induced by undue influence
it could have been changed after that influence was removed. The fact that deceased retained this will in her
possession and under her control for three years after it
was executed is a circumstance of utmost importance to
be considered in this case. It was found after her death
locked in a steel cabinet in her home. (R. 87, 89) The
fact that she did not destroy or change this will is further
evidence that it represented her desires as to the disposition of her estate and further helps to nullify the contention of a continuing undue influence.
The record is uncontradicted that neither Snyder
nor Buehner had any contact with Margaret Holten after
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the earlier will was executed and had nothing whatever
do with the later one. (R. 137, 141, 142, 153)

to

Appellant, in arguing for the proposition of a continuing undue influence, suggests, at page 3 3 of his brief,
that the withdrawal of funds by decedent from her joint
account in Tracy-Collins Bank is evidence of a paranoid
reaction and a continuing undue influence exerted upon
her. The statement is patently absurd and deserves little
comment or consideration. It is pure speculation and
conjecture, not based upon any evidence. There could
be a hundred plausible explanations and in the absence
of evidence one would merit no more consideration than
another.

In the face of testimony such as this, the claim that

there is a presumption that the idea of leaving her property to the Church was put into the mind of Margaret
Holten and originated in the minds of Carl Buehner and
Vernon Snyder vanishes like fog in the sun. The testimony of both Snyder and Buehner, uncontradicted, sustained, and corroborated by appellant's own witness,
Pauline Hamilton, shows that when the last will was
written by Margaret Holten she was adhering to a decision made by her, long before she met Buehner or Snyder, that her property when she died would go to the
Church and not to her brother.
Furthermore, the very fact that in her last will decedent removed Carl Buehner as executor as named in
her first will, is eloquent testimony of the fact that if he
ever had any influence with her as to the disposition of
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her estate, it disappeared sometime between February 18,
1959, and October 13, 1959.

VII THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES AS A MATTER
OF LAW THAT TESTATRIX HAD TESTAMENT ARY CAPACITY AT THE TIME OF THE
EXECUTION OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL.
Appellant's final argument is on the issue of alleged
testamentary incapacity. On that issue the burden of
proof was on the appellant and never could be fixed to
the respondents. On that issue, appellant was required
to do more than make out a prima facie case. He had
the burden of proving testamentary incapacity by the
preponderance of the evidence.

It is useless for appellant to assert or even to prove
that the cause of decedent's death was a brain tumor
from which she died on October 14, 1962, or that she
had other infirmities and disabilites, or that she was a
peculiar personality or could have been easily influenced
through appeals to her religious belief, or that her attitude
toward her brother was unnatural in that she imagined
without justification that he did not care for her and
was only interested in her money, or that she thought
that he had tried to kill her on one occasion. Such
matters are of no consequence unless it is shown that,
by reason of these conditions, the testatrix was unable
to recognize the natural objects of her bounty or to know
and understand what property she owned and to form a
plan for disposing of it by will. These are the only tests
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of testamentary capacity which the law applies to a determination of that fact.

In re Hanson's Will, 50 Utah 207, 167 P. 256 (1917),
the Court stated at page 222:
"It is upon instances similar to those just illustrated, and upon the facts that the testator was
untidy in his personal habits and dress and at
home, and that he had a miserly disposition and
an entire lack of affection for his offspring, which
were the principal grounds that induced the witnesses to consider him of unsound mind. Indeed,
the weight of the evidence is to the effect that
they considered him so because he was unlike
other men. He was not as they observed other
men, and expressions of that character. The fact
is that the evidence discloses eccentricities on the
part of the testator which at times were induced
and aggravated by the fact that the testator was
afflicted with the physical infirmities of being
deaf, of having some ailment of the throat and of
the eyes. True, he has some other physical defects, but those were of minor importance. Eccentricities and idiosyncracies, however gross, do
not constitute insanity, and cannot incapacitate
one otherwise sound from making a valid will.
The finding of the jury that the testator was not
insane at the time he made the will is not only
supported by, but it is the only conclusion permissible under the evidence." (Emphasis added)

In re Buttars' Estate, 123 Utah 596, 261 P. 2d 171

(1953), the court stated at page 601:

* * The evidence related above is proof that
testatrix was eccentric in her actions and forget-

"*
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fµl at times of some things, but is utterly insufficient to sustain the contestants' burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
she lacked testamentary capacity at the time she
executed the Will."
A very enlightening case upon the effect of an abnormal personality, specifically, a testator alleged to have
been a paranoid, is cited in appellant's brief (p. 3 8).
This case is In re Hansen's Will, 52 Utah 554, 177 P. 982
(1918), wherein this court stated at page 567-68:
"Counsel for contestants do not claim that the
testator. was generally insane, but contended
'that he entertained beliefs respecting his children, and respecting other people, and respecting
his money and the disposition he should make
thereof, which were without foundation in fact'
and in the execution of his will he was the 'victim
of' progressive paranoia, an incurable disease,
which related to and influenced the provisions
made for strangers and the exclusion of his children. In other words, he was laboring under an
insane delusion with regard to objects of his
bounty. Counsel have cited no cases, nor authority, and we think none can be found, where similar
facts and circumstances as detailed by the contestants' witnesses were held to be sufficient to
support a finding by either court or jury of
mental incompetency to make a will."

The court in conclusion stated at pages 570-71:
"Upon

what

reasonable

hypothesis

may

the
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courts penetrate. the mind of this man and find
that his was an 'unnatural will,' or treat the testimony in this case as even tending to establish
that he was controlled by an 'insane delusion' in
the making of his will? If, under the record here,
we are to sustain the contention of contestants,
that we may not disturb the verdict of the jury in
finding the will invalid, then, indeed, the civil
right of making testamentary disposition of property in this state is but as the will-o-the-wisp,
and forever disappears upon the bald assertion
of the medical expert that the individual who
seeks to exercise the legal right to do so labored
under an insane delusion, and that his eccentricities, habits, and conduct of life are conclusive of
the fact. Such is not the law of wills." (Emphasis
added)
The above mentioned cases support the propos1t1on
that peculiarities and idiosyncrasies and attitudes and
hostility toward close relatives, even children, are no
proof of mental incapacity to make a will. We have
nothing in the record of this case more than some evidence of these things which the cases all say will not
support a finding of testamentary incapacity.
The two experts who testified would not conclude,
despite all of the entries of the diary and the physical
infirmities of the deceased, that she did not retain sufficient mental capacity to make a will on October 13,
1959. If anyone could have given an opinion that Margaret Holten was mentally incompetent, it was Dr. Henrie and Dr. Bernson based upon the entries in her diary
and upon the medical records introduced in evidence.
They were furnished with information upon which their
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expert knowledge could form a conclusion, assuming her
·particular mental peculiarities and abnormalities and
the effect of her physical infirmities upon her behavior.
Dr. Henrie refused to voice any opinion that Margaret
Holten had been unduly influenced in the making of
her last or any will or that she was mentally incompetent
to make a will. (R. 177, 178, 181, 183, 185) Dr. Bernson
stated that if Margaret Holten had capacity to take care
of her affairs, collect money, etc., a year before he saw her,
she·probably was mentally competent at that time. (R.
220, 222, 223)

CONCLUSION
Based upon the record in this case, there was absolutely no evidence that the last will and testament of
Margaret Schramm Holten was the product of undue
influence exerted upon her on October 13, 1959, or that
she, on that date, did not possess sufficient mental capacity
to execute her last will and testament. On the contrary,
the evidence is clear that she had testamentary capacity
and that there was no undue influence. The record
further shows that there could be no presumption of
undue influence because the record is clear and uncontradicted that Margaret Holten, long before she ever saw
either Bishop Buehner or Vernon Snyder, had determined
that she would leave her property to her church when she
died and not to her brother. This being the state of the
record when plaintiff rested, the trial court should have
granted respondent's motion for a directed verdict at that
time and should not even have required that respondents
rest their case before granting such motion. It is sub-
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mitted, therefore, that the ruling of the trial court must
be affirmed.
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